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Summary
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) was established by the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997 to expand health insurance coverage to uninsured 
children in families with income that is modest but too 
high to qualify for Medicaid. SCHIP is financed jointly 
by the federal government and the states, and it is admin-
istered by the states within broad federal guidelines. Since 
the program’s inception, the Congress has provided 
nearly $40 billion for it. Approximately 6.6 million chil-
dren were enrolled in SCHIP at some time during 2006, 
as were about 670,000 adults through waivers of statu-
tory provisions. Under current law, SCHIP is not autho-
rized to continue beyond 2007, and the Congress is con-
sidering reauthorization of the program this year. 
Overview of SCHIP 
States have considerable flexibility in designing their eligi-
bility requirements and policies for SCHIP. 1 In 2006, 26 
states set their eligibility thresholds at 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level, 15 states had thresholds above 200 
percent of the poverty level, and 9 had thresholds below.2 
(The federal poverty level for a family of three in 2007 is 
$17,170.) The lowest eligibility threshold in a state was 
140 percent of the poverty level and the highest was 
350 percent. Most states subtract a portion of the family’s 
earnings and certain expenses to compute a measure of 
net income that is used to determine a child’s eligibility 
for SCHIP.
States can provide SCHIP coverage by expanding Medic-
aid to children not eligible for that program, creating a 
separate program under SCHIP, or using a combination 
of the two approaches.3 In 2006, 11 states expanded 
Medicaid, 18 states operated a separate program under 
SCHIP, and 21 states used a combination approach.4 
States that provide SCHIP coverage by expanding Medic-
aid must provide the same benefits that are available 
under their Medicaid program and follow all other 
requirements of that program. States that create a sepa-
rate program under SCHIP are subject to certain mini-
mum standards, including providing a benefit package 
that is based on one of several specified “benchmark” 
insurance plans or an alternative that is actuarially equiva-
lent or otherwise approved by the federal government.
Each year, the federal funding for SCHIP is allocated 
among states on the basis of a formula that takes into 
account the number of children in low-income families 
in each state, the number of such children who are unin-
sured, and wages in the health services sector in the state 
relative to the national average. States must provide 
matching funds for expenditures from their federal allot-
ments and have up to three years to spend those allot-
ments. Funds that are not spent within three years are 
redistributed to states that have exhausted their allot-
ments and are made available to those states for an 
additional year.
1. This paper focuses primarily on the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia (which, for the purpose here is counted as a “state”). 
The five U.S. territories—Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, 
American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands—also have 
programs under SCHIP. Tennessee did not have any enrollment in 
SCHIP between 2002 and 2006. 
2. Elicia J. Herz and Chris L. Peterson, State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP): A Brief Overview, CRS Report for 
Congress RL30473 (Congressional Research Service, 
October 12, 2006; updated January 30, 2007).
3. In some states that use a combination approach, children at the 
lower end of the income range of eligibility are enrolled under the 
expansion of Medicaid, while children at the upper end of the 
range are enrolled in the separate program under SCHIP. Using a 
different approach, other states cover children below a certain age 
under the Medicaid expansion and older children under the sepa-
rate program.
4. Herz and Peterson, State Children’s Health Insurance Program.
VIII THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM
To encourage states to participate in SCHIP, the federal 
government pays a higher share of their spending on 
SCHIP than it pays for Medicaid. The federal govern-
ment’s matching rate for SCHIP varies among states from 
65 percent to 83 percent, while the federal matching rate 
for Medicaid varies from 50 percent to 76 percent. 
Although federal spending is made available on a match-
ing basis for both programs, the nature of the programs 
differs significantly because SCHIP is a grant program in 
which federal spending is capped in advance whereas 
Medicaid is an entitlement program with no predeter-
mined limit on spending.
Because the implementation of SCHIP occurred over sev-
eral years, federal spending on the program was lower in 
its initial years. As the states’ programs matured, federal 
spending exceeded current-year allotments starting in 
2002. Some states have been able to spend more federal 
dollars than their allotment in a particular year by draw-
ing on unspent funds from previous years and funds 
redistributed from other states. Yet a great deal of varia-
tion exists among states in their spending relative to their 
allotments: Federal spending falls short of the allotments 
in some states and exceeds it in others. In recent years, 
some states have projected that they will exhaust their 
federal funds. As a result, the Congress has acted twice to 
provide additional funding. The Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 appropriated an additional $283 million for 
SCHIP in 2006, and the National Institutes of Health 
Reform Act of 2006 included provisions modifying the 
redistribution of unspent funds from previous years to 
provide additional funds in 2007.
The implications of exhausting the available SCHIP 
funds vary among states. States that provide coverage by 
expanding Medicaid automatically receive federal match-
ing payments under the Medicaid program once their 
SCHIP funds have been exhausted, but at the lower 
matching rate for Medicaid. Similarly, states that operate 
a combination program receive federal matching pay-
ments under Medicaid for beneficiaries who are enrolled 
in the Medicaid component of their program. In con-
trast, states that operate a separate program under SCHIP 
receive no additional federal matching payments once 
their available SCHIP funds have been exhausted. How-
ever, those states can constrain their expenditures through 
measures such as capping enrollment or increasing premi-
ums, which are not allowed in states that provide SCHIP 
coverage through an expansion of Medicaid. In addition, 
states that operate a separate program have the option of 
converting some or all of their program into an expansion 
of Medicaid, which would provide access to additional 
federal matching funds under that program.
The Effect of SCHIP on Children’s 
Health Insurance Coverage
SCHIP has significantly reduced the number of low-
income children who are uninsured. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) analysis, among 
children living in families with income between 100 per-
cent and 200 percent of the poverty level (the group with 
the greatest increase in eligibility for public coverage 
under SCHIP), the uninsurance rate fell from 22.5 per-
cent in 1996 (the year before SCHIP was enacted) to 
16.9 percent in 2005, a reduction of 25 percent. In con-
trast, the uninsurance rate among higher-income children 
remained relatively stable during that period. SCHIP has 
also apparently contributed to an increase in insurance 
coverage among children below the poverty level, as 
states’ outreach efforts and simplified enrollment proce-
dures for SCHIP appear to have increased the percentage 
of eligible children who participate in Medicaid.5 
Although SCHIP has significantly reduced the number of 
uninsured children in low-income families, the net effect 
on the extent of coverage is smaller than the number of 
children who have been enrolled in public coverage as a 
result of SCHIP because the increase in public coverage 
has been partially offset by a reduction in private cover-
age.6 SCHIP provides an alternative source of coverage 
that is less expensive and that often provides a broader 
range of benefits than private insurance. As a result, some 
parents who otherwise would have enrolled their children 
in private coverage may prefer instead to switch their cov-
erage to SCHIP.7 In addition, to the extent that SCHIP 
5. Most children below the poverty level are eligible for Medicaid. 
Children who apply for SCHIP must be enrolled in Medicaid if 
they are eligible for that program.
6. For the purpose of this paper, private coverage is insurance that is 
privately financed; it includes employer-sponsored insurance and 
private nongroup insurance. Public coverage is publicly financed, 
although some states use private health plans to deliver care to 
enrollees in SCHIP.
7. Such a change in coverage need not result from the parents of pre-
viously insured children dropping their coverage to enroll them in 
SCHIP, although that is one possibility. Another possibility, for 
example, is for parents who lost their coverage to decline coverage 
at a new job if their children are eligible for (or already enrolled 
in) SCHIP. 
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makes private coverage less important for some low-
income families, parents might be more inclined to take 
jobs that offer higher cash wages rather than health insur-
ance. Moreover, if employers of low-wage workers believe 
that SCHIP reduces the value of private health insurance 
in attracting employees, some might reduce their contri-
bution to the premiums for family coverage, reduce the 
benefits offered, stop offering family coverage, or stop 
offering insurance altogether.
Considerable potential thus exists for increases in SCHIP 
coverage to be partially offset by a reduction in private 
coverage. For example, about 60 percent of the children 
who were eligible for the program were covered by private 
insurance in the year before the program was enacted.8 
But measuring the extent to which enrollment in SCHIP 
has actually been offset by a reduction in private coverage 
is difficult. Estimates vary depending on the measure that 
is used. Moreover, studies have obtained widely varying 
estimates depending on the data sources and methods 
used.
On the basis of a review of the research literature, CBO 
concludes that the most reliable estimates currently avail-
able suggest that the reduction in private coverage among 
children is between a quarter and a half of the increase in 
public coverage resulting from SCHIP. In other words, 
for every 100 children who enroll as a result of SCHIP, 
there is a corresponding reduction in private coverage of 
between 25 and 50 children.9 The available evidence, 
which is quite limited, suggests that the bulk of the 
reduction in private coverage occurs because parents 
choose to forgo private coverage and enroll their children 
in SCHIP (because of better benefits, lower costs, or 
some combination thereof ), rather than employers decid-
ing to drop coverage for such children. No studies have 
estimated the extent to which SCHIP reduces private 
coverage among parents, so the available estimates proba-
bly understate the total reduction in private coverage 
associated with the introduction of SCHIP. 
Changes to the program may generate different effects on 
private coverage than those estimates suggest; in general, 
expanding the program to children in higher-income 
families is likely to generate more of an offsetting reduc-
tion in private coverage (and therefore less of a net reduc-
tion in uninsurance) than expanding the program to 
more children in low-income families. (Over the course 
of 2005, an average of nearly 2 million children were 
apparently eligible for SCHIP but remained unin-
sured.)10 As discussed below, policymakers are exploring 
options to increase participation among eligible children.
Key Issues for Reauthorizing SCHIP
The process of reauthorizing SCHIP gives the Congress 
an opportunity to reexamine the program’s design and 
reassess budgetary priorities. A key issue is the level of 
federal funding for the program and whether funding lev-
els will be adjusted to account for growth in enrollment 
and health care costs and for possible changes in the 
design of the program, including eligibility rules and ben-
efit packages. Until recently, the level of federal funding 
has not been an issue because states generally could cover 
their SCHIP spending through a combination of annual 
allotments; unspent funds from earlier years; and, if eligi-
ble, redistributed funds from other states. In addition, the 
Congress has provided additional money to prevent states 
from exhausting their federal funds. If federal funding for 
the program in the future did not keep pace with 
increases in health care spending per beneficiary and the 
number of enrollees, an increasing number of states 
would exhaust their federal funds. As a result, states 
would have to pay an increasing share of costs to main-
tain their current programs, modify their programs to 
lower spending, or both.
8. Julie L. Hudson, Thomas M. Selden, and Jessica S. Banthin, “The 
Impact of SCHIP on Insurance Coverage of Children,” Inquiry, 
vol. 42, no. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 232–254.
9. That range includes estimates obtained under various approaches. 
For example, one approach seeks to estimate the reduction in pri-
vate coverage associated with both the increase in enrollment in 
SCHIP and the increase in enrollment in Medicaid that is attrib-
utable to SCHIP. Another approach seeks to estimate the reduc-
tion in private coverage associated just with the increase in 
enrollment in SCHIP. A final approach examines the share of 
SCHIP enrollees who had private coverage before enrolling.
10. Genevieve Kenney and Allison Cook, Coverage Patterns Among 
SCHIP-Eligible Children and Their Parents (Washington, D.C.: 
Urban Institute, Health Policy Online, no. 15, February 2007).
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A number of options to modify the program have been 
suggested:
B Intensifying efforts to enroll uninsured children who 
are eligible for SCHIP or Medicaid.
B Redefining the target population—either broadening 
it or narrowing it—by changing the income levels 
determining eligibility; changing the rules regarding 
the eligibility of adults; or expanding eligibility to new 
groups, such as pregnant women, legal immigrants, 
and children of state employees.
B Changing the formula that determines the distribu-
tion of federal SCHIP funding among states.
B Modifying the rules for the redistribution of unspent 
funds.
B Changing the matching rates for SCHIP.
B Modifying the benefits that states are required to pro-
vide—for example, by requiring that states provide 
services covered under Medicaid’s Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program.
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program
The Design of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
was created by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public 
Law 105-33), under title XXI of the Social Security Act. 
The program provides federal funding that states can use 
to expand health insurance coverage to uninsured chil-
dren living in families with income that is low but too 
high to be eligible for Medicaid. Under broad federal 
guidelines, the program grants states flexibility in how 
they design their programs, including eligibility, benefits, 
and cost-sharing provisions. (See Box 1 for a comparison 
with Medicaid.)
Eligibility Criteria for Children
SCHIP was designed for uninsured children under age 19 
living in families with income that is low but above Med-
icaid’s threshold.1 According to the SCHIP statute, states 
may cover children living in families with income up to 
200 percent of the federal poverty level or 50 percentage 
points above their Medicaid threshold.2 States are also 
allowed to disregard certain types of income and expenses 
in determining eligibility for the program. Eligibility cri-
teria vary among the states. As of 2006, 26 states had a 
threshold of 200 percent of the poverty level, 15 states set 
the limit above 200 percent of the poverty level, and 9 
states set it below 200 percent of the poverty level. North 
Dakota had the lowest threshold, at 140 percent of 
the poverty level, while New Jersey had the highest, at 
350 percent of the poverty level.3 In addition, variation 
among states in their Medicaid thresholds means that 
programs under SCHIP with equal thresholds may cover 
different segments of the population. For example, both 
Colorado and Kentucky have thresholds for SCHIP of 
200 percent of the poverty level, but Kentucky’s program 
covers a narrower range of people because its Medicaid 
program covers children in families with income up to 
150 percent of the poverty level, whereas for Colorado’s 
Medicaid program, the threshold is the poverty level.4
States with a separate program under SCHIP (as opposed 
to implementing SCHIP through an expansion of Med-
icaid) have some flexibility to control enrollment. For 
example, such states can cap or freeze enrollment. They 
can also impose waiting periods, typically lasting three to 
six months, during which children must be uninsured—
a provision originally intended to discourage people from 
dropping private health insurance coverage for children 
in order to enroll them in SCHIP. 
Eligibility Criteria for Adults
A number of states have used waiver authority to expand 
coverage under SCHIP to adults. Covering parents may 
help to increase participation among children, because 
parents who are eligible may be more likely to enroll their 
children also. In particular, section 1115 of the Social 
Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services the authority to waive certain statutory and regu-
latory requirements of Medicaid and SCHIP. The Secre-
tary has used that authority to allow states to expand
1. Children of state employees cannot be covered under a separate 
program under SCHIP if they are eligible for coverage under a 
state health benefits plan. In addition, SCHIP is generally limited 
to citizens and to legal immigrants who have resided in the United 
States for five or more years.
2. States are required to maintain the Medicaid threshold that was in 
place just before SCHIP was enacted. That requirement, known 
as “maintenance of effort,” prevents states from lowering their 
Medicaid threshold in order to receive a higher matching rate 
under SCHIP for children who would have otherwise been cov-
ered by Medicaid.
3. New Jersey, for example, has effectively expanded its threshold to 
350 percent of the poverty level by disregarding all income 
between 200 percent and 350 percent of the poverty level. 
4. Those Medicaid thresholds apply for children between the ages of 
6 and 19.
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eligibility for SCHIP to low-income parents, pregnant 
women, and adults without children.5 As a condition for 
those waivers, states are required to cover those popula-
tions with funds not used to cover children. Section 1115 
waivers also provide states additional flexibility to use 
SCHIP funds to subsidize the purchase of private health 
insurance through premium assistance programs. Of the 
18 states that have obtained section 1115 waivers, 13 
have expanded coverage to parents, related caretakers, 
and legal guardians, as well as pregnant women. Adults 
without children are currently covered in four states; 
however, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-
171) prohibits the approval of such waivers in the future. 
The Design of Benefits
States have the option of enrolling children by expanding 
their existing Medicaid program, creating a separate pro-
gram under SCHIP, or implementing a combination of 
the two approaches. As of 2006, 11 states used an expan-
sion under Medicaid, 18 states used a separate program, 
and 21 states used a combination of the two approaches. 
States that implement SCHIP by expanding Medicaid 
must provide all of the benefits that are covered in their 
Medicaid plan. States that choose a separate program 
must provide a benefit package that is based on one of
Box 1.
A Brief Overview of Medicaid and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program
Medicaid, enacted under title XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act in 1965, offers health insurance coverage to a 
variety of low-income individuals, including children 
and their parents, pregnant women, the disabled, and 
the elderly. In 2006, about 30 million nondisabled 
children were enrolled in Medicaid, accounting for 
roughly $31 billion in federal expenditures. (Medic-
aid also provides coverage to about 1 million disabled 
children, primarily recipients of Supplemental Secu-
rity Income benefits.)
 The State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) was enacted as part of the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997, under title XXI of the Social Security 
Act, to provide health insurance coverage to unin-
sured children living in families with income that is 
low but too high to qualify for Medicaid. Over the 
course of 2006, 6.7 million children were enrolled in 
SCHIP, at a total cost to the federal government of 
$4.8 billion.
Both Medicaid and SCHIP are financed by the fed-
eral government and the states. The federal govern-
ment matches spending according to a formula that 
determines the matching rate. Medicaid is an open-
ended entitlement program, with no predetermined 
limit on federal spending. Annual federal funding for 
SCHIP, by contrast, is set at a fixed level ($5 billion 
for 2007), and each state receives an allotment based 
on the number of children in low-income families, 
the number of such children who are uninsured, and 
health care costs. 
Under Medicaid, the federal government matches 
states’ spending using a matching rate, known as the 
federal medical assistance percentage, or FMAP, that 
is based on each state’s per capita income relative 
to the national average. In 2007, the FMAP ranges 
from 50 percent to 76 percent. Under SCHIP, the 
federal government matches states’ spending using a 
higher rate that, in 2007, ranges from 65 percent to 
83 percent.
5. In addition to waivers, the SCHIP statute allows states to pur-
chase family coverage with SCHIP funds if such coverage is 
deemed cost-effective and does not displace private coverage. 
(Family coverage is considered to be cost-effective when the cost 
does not exceed that of coverage for children only.) That statutory 
test has seldom, if ever, been passed.
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several “benchmark” insurance plans, 6 a package that is 
actuarially equivalent to a benchmark plan, an existing 
state-funded plan,7 or any other benefit plan approved by 
the federal government. Some states with a separate pro-
gram have gone beyond the minimum federal require-
ments for a benefit package. For example, many states 
cover dental and vision services, even though those 
services are normally not covered by private health 
insurance.8
Cost Sharing and Premiums 
States that have chosen to participate in SCHIP by 
expanding their Medicaid program are required to follow 
Medicaid’s guidelines for cost sharing and premiums. 
Historically, children in the Medicaid program were 
exempt from cost sharing or premiums. However, as of 
March 31, 2006 (with the enactment of the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005), states have the option of impos-
ing cost sharing for some children under their Medicaid 
program (except for preventive services), including a pro-
gram under SCHIP that expands Medicaid. For children 
living in families with income below the poverty level, 
premiums are prohibited but nominal cost sharing is 
allowed for certain services—namely, prescription drugs 
and nonemergency care provided in a hospital. For chil-
dren living in families with income between 100 percent 
Box 2.
Overview of the Financing Structure for the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program
Federal Funding Levels. Legislation provided the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
federal funding for 1998 to 2007.
Annual State Allotments. For each fiscal year, federal 
funding is allocated among states on the basis of the 
number of children in low-income households, the 
number of such children who are uninsured, and a 
geographic cost factor for health care wages. Floors or 
ceilings may result in adjusted annual allotments. 
Federal Matching Rates. The federal government 
matches states’ SCHIP spending using an enhanced 
matching rate (relative to that of Medicaid) that 
ranges from 65 percent to 83 percent. 
Availability of Allotments. In general, states have 
three years to spend their original allotments. For 
instance, in 2006 a state had SCHIP funds from its 
2006 allotment plus any unspent funds from 2004 
and 2005.
Redistribution of Unspent Funds. In general, any 
funds that are not spent within three years are redis-
tributed to states that have spent all of their funds. 
Recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices has redistributed funds only to those states that 
are projected to exhaust all of their available funds. 
Redistributed funds that remain unused after one 
year expire.
Total Funds Available to States. Total available funds 
for states in any given year are equal to the sum of 
their annual allotment plus any unspent funds from 
previous years plus any funding redistributed from 
other states. 
Note: Different procedures apply to the U.S. territories’
programs under SCHIP.
6. A state may choose one of three benchmark plans: the Blue Cross/
Blue Shield Standard Option Service Benefit Plan offered under 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, a health benefit 
plan that is available to the state’s employees, or a plan offered by 
the HMO (health maintenance organization) with the largest 
enrollment outside of Medicaid in the state. 
7. Florida, New York, and Pennsylvania had state-funded programs 
prior to the enactment of SCHIP. The benefits provided under 
those programs were deemed to meet SCHIP’s requirements.
8. Margo Rosenbach and others, Implementation of the State Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program: Synthesis of State Evaluations 
(report submitted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., to the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, March 2003).
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and 150 percent of the poverty level, states cannot charge 
premiums, and coinsurance is capped at 10 percent of the 
charge for a given service. For children living in families 
with higher income levels, premiums are allowed, and 
copayments can be as high as 20 percent. For all income 
levels, the sum of cost sharing and premiums cannot 
exceed 5 percent of family income. 
In separate programs under SCHIP, cost sharing is 
allowed for certain populations and services. However, 
as in the Medicaid program, states are prohibited from 
imposing cost-sharing requirements for preventive ser-
vices. For children living in families with income below 
150 percent of the poverty level, premiums cannot exceed 
Medicaid’s limits, and cost sharing is limited to nominal 
amounts. For families with income above 150 percent of 
the poverty level, states can impose premiums and cost 
sharing of up to 20 percent. For all income levels, 
expenses for cost sharing and premiums cannot exceed 
5 percent of annual income.
As of 2005, 39 states had cost-sharing requirements 
under SCHIP.9 States with a program expanding Medic-
aid have been less likely to require cost sharing, but they 
could expand the use of it under new Medicaid rules. 
The Financing of SCHIP
As part of the implementation of SCHIP, national fund-
ing levels were specified for 1998 to 2007. In addition, 
the SCHIP statute established a formula for determining 
each state’s share of the federal funding, a matching rate 
for federal reimbursement of SCHIP spending, and a 
mechanism for redistributing states’ unused SCHIP 
funds. (See Box 2 for an overview of the program’s financ-
ing structure.)
Federal Funding for SCHIP
Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP is not an open-ended entitle-
ment program: SCHIP is a matching grant program with 
a fixed nationwide cap on federal spending. The Con-
gress provided roughly $40 billion for 1998 to 2007. 
Annual funding levels were specified in the original 
SCHIP legislation as follows: for 1998 through 2001, 
roughly $4.2 billion annually; for 2002 through 2004, 
about $3.2 billion per year; for 2005 and 2006, $4 billion 
per year; and for 2007, $5 billion.
The State Allocation Formula
Each state receives an annual SCHIP allotment based on 
two factors: an estimate of the target population and an 
adjustment reflecting the cost of providing medical ser-
vices there.10
Estimate of Target Population. The target population is 
based on the number of children under the age of 19 liv-
ing in low-income families (families with income below 
200 percent of the poverty level) in that state and the 
number of such children who are uninsured. 
When SCHIP was first implemented, the allotment for-
mula was solely based on the number of uninsured chil-
dren in low-income families. In 2000, the number of 
such children was given a weight of 75 percent, and the 
number of low-income children received a weight of 
25 percent.11 Since 2001, each factor has received an 
equal weight of 50 percent. 
Estimates of the total number of children in low-income 
families and the number of such children who are unin-
sured are derived using the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement to the Current Population Survey (formerly 
known as the March Supplement) conducted by the 
Bureau of the Census. Because of a lack of precision in 
estimating the figures for some of the states with data 
from a single year, the formula is based on the average of 
the most recent three surveys.12 
9. Statement of Kathryn G. Allen, Director, Health Care, Govern-
ment Accountability Office, before the Subcommittee on Health 
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, published as 
Government Accountability Office, Children’s Health Insurance: 
States’ SCHIP Enrollment and Spending Experiences and Consider-
ations for Reauthorization, GAO-07-558T (March 1, 2007).
10. SCHIP funding for the five territories is not based on that for-
mula; in aggregate, they receive 0.25 percent of the total funding; 
additional funding has been appropriated to the territories starting 
in 1999.
11. That change was introduced by the Medicare, Medicaid and 
SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 with the pur-
pose of limiting the reduction in the share of federal SCHIP fund-
ing among states that were successful in enrolling children in the 
program.
12. The Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refine-
ment Act of 1999 provided new funding to increase the sample 
size of the survey in order to improve the reliability of the 
estimates.
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Table 1.
Enrollment in the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, 
1998 to 2006
Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services.
Notes: n.a. = not applicable.
The figures for the number of people enrolled reflect enroll-
ment at any time during the year. The number of people 
enrolled in an average month would be about 60 percent of 
the above totals.
There was a change in reporting between 2004 and 2005. 
Prior to 2005, in states with a combination program, chil-
dren enrolled in both the Medicaid expansion and the sepa-
rate program during a given year were counted twice. 
Starting in 2005, however, those children were counted only 
in the program where they were last enrolled.
a. Preliminary. 
Geographic Cost Adjustment. SCHIP allotments for 
states are also adjusted to account for differences in health 
care costs. The formula includes a so-called state cost fac-
tor that is based on the ratio of wages in the health ser-
vices industry in the state relative to the national aver-
age.13 Estimates of wages in the health care industry in 
states are calculated using data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. As with the estimates of the number of chil-
dren, wage data are averaged across three years.
States’ Annual Allotment of Federal SCHIP Funds. To 
compute each state’s annual allotment, the above two fac-
tors (the target population and the geographic cost 
adjustment) are multiplied, and the products for each 
state are summed. Each state’s percentage of that total is 
multiplied by the annual federal funding level, yielding 
the state’s allotted amount for that year. Annual allot-
ments are also subject to floors and ceilings. A $2 million 
floor has been in effect since the beginning of the pro-
gram but has never been constraining because all states 
have qualified for funds in excess of that amount. The 
Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act of 1999 (incorporated in the Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. 106-
113) instituted two new floors effective as of 2000: A 
state’s share of the annual funding could be no lower than 
90 percent of the previous year’s share and no lower than 
70 percent of the 1999 share. The law also introduced a 
ceiling such that a state’s annual allotment could not 
exceed 145 percent of the 1999 share.14 
Each state is paid a matching rate for SCHIP expendi-
tures up to its available funds. The “enhanced” federal 
matching rate for SCHIP is higher than that for Medic-
aid. In 2007, the matching rate for SCHIP ranges from 
65 percent to 83 percent, whereas for Medicaid, it ranges 
from 50 percent to 76 percent.15 The national average 
matching rate for SCHIP is 69 percent and for Medicaid, 
57 percent.
Both Medicaid and SCHIP include federal funds for 
administrative expenses. For Medicaid, the federal match-
ing rate for that purpose is set at 50 percent, with the 
exception of certain expenses matched at higher rates. For 
SCHIP, the federal matching rate for administrative 
expenses is the same as the enhanced matching rate for 
the program, with a limit of 10 percent of the annual 
SCHIP expenditures.
Redistribution of Unspent SCHIP Funds. In general, states 
are given three years to spend their allotments. Then, the 
federal government redistributes unspent funds to states 
that spent all of their funds within the three-year period. 
13. Specifically, the state cost factor is the result of the following for-
mula: 0.15 + 0.85 * (wagesstate/wagesnational average).
Fiscal
Year
1998 660 n.a. 0 n.a.
1999 2,014 205 0 n.a.
2000 3,358 67 0 n.a.
2001 4,603 37 234 n.a.
2002 5,354 16 374 60
2003 5,985 12 484 29
2004 6,103 2 646 33
2005 6,114 0 639 -1
2006a 6,622 9 671 5
Percentage Percentage
Change from
Previous
Year
Number of
(Thousands)
Adults
Number of
Children
(Thousands)
Change from
Previous
Year
14. For more detail, see John L. Czajka and Thomas B. Jabine, “Using 
Survey Data to Allocate Federal Funds for the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP),” Journal of Official Statistics, 
vol. 18, no. 3 (2002), pp. 417–418.
15. SCHIP’s formula for the matching rate is based on the state’s fed-
eral medical assistance percentage (FMAP), as used in the Medic-
aid program, and equals FMAP + 0.3 * (100 - FMAP), with an 
upper limit of 85 percent. The enhanced rate was originally 
adopted to encourage states’ participation in SCHIP.
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Table 2.
Allotments and Spending Under the 
State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, 1998 to 2007
(Millions of dollars)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 2005, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
a. For both states and the five territories.
b. In general, states’ annual allotments are available for three fis-
cal years. Any funds unspent after three years become available 
to other states with projected spending in excess of their alloca-
tion plus any available funds from previous years.
c. Includes additional funding from the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005.
d. Projection by the Congressional Budget Office.
Most recently, the redistribution of funds has been a way 
to provide funding to states with projected spending in 
excess of available funds. (Redistributed funds that 
remain unused after one year expire, a phenomenon that 
occurred at the end of 2004 and 2005.) Therefore, the 
total funding available to states is equal to the sum of 
their original allotment plus any unspent funds from pre-
vious years plus any funding redistributed from other 
states.
Redistribution rules have been amended a number of 
times, both by extending and shortening the periods dur-
ing which unspent funds are available. Because states 
were initially slow in spending their allotments, the Con-
gress allowed the states to retain some of their allotments 
longer than three years. In contrast, because recent spend-
ing has outpaced federal funds, the National Institutes of 
Health Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-482) required that 
a portion of unspent 2005 allotments be redistributed in 
2007 instead of 2008.
Funding Interactions Between Medicaid and SCHIP. The 
type of program that a state operates under SCHIP has 
distinct implications for funding levels. States choosing to 
implement SCHIP by expanding Medicaid may continue 
receiving federal matching funds at that program’s lower 
federal matching rate once their SCHIP spending exceeds 
their available funds. In contrast, states operating a sepa-
rate program receive federal matching funds (at the 
enhanced rate) only for their available funds (unless they 
convert their program to a Medicaid expansion).16
Enrollment in and Expenditures for 
SCHIP
The number of children enrolled in SCHIP at any time 
during the year increased from 660,000 in 1998 to 
6.6 million in 2006 (see Table 1). Enrollment grew very 
rapidly as states first implemented their programs, reach-
ing almost 6 million children by 2003. Since then, enroll-
ment has slowed as states’ programs have matured and as 
some states have enacted policies to restrict enrollment in 
response to budgetary pressures. About 670,000 adults 
were enrolled at some time during the year in 2006.
Initially, federal spending on SCHIP was well below the 
allotments, as states implemented their programs (see 
Table 2). However, since 2002, federal spending has 
exceeded the annual allotments every year. Because 
unspent funds from previous years and the redistribution 
of unspent funds provide additional funding for some 
states, the exhaustion of funding in those states has been 
forestalled. Recently, however, some states have had insuf-
ficient federal funds available to fully match their desired 
level of SCHIP spending. As a result, the Congress has 
acted twice to provide additional funding. The Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 appropriated an extra $283 mil-
lion in federal funding to support states’ SCHIP spend-
ing in 2006. The National Institutes of Health Reform
Fiscal
Year
1998 4,235 n.a. 122 0
1999 4,247 n.a. 922 0
2000 4,249 n.a. 1,929 0
2001 4,249 2,034 2,672 0
2002 3,115 2,819 3,776 0
2003 3,175 2,206 4,276 0
2004 3,175 1,749 4,645 1,281
2005 4,082 643 5,089 128
2006 4,365 c 173 5,452 0
2007 5,040 147 5,656 d 0
SCHIP
Allotmentsa
Allotments
Unspent After
3 Yearsb
Federal
Spending
Funds
Expiring
16. As previously discussed, those states have other options that allow 
them to control their SCHIP expenditures, including charging 
limited premiums and cost sharing, capping enrollment, or estab-
lishing waiting lists.
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Figure 1.
Percentage of Children Who Were 
Uninsured, by Family Income as a 
Percentage of the Federal Poverty 
Level, 1996 to 2005
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Cur-
rent Population Survey for 1996 to 2005. 
Note: FPL = federal poverty level. 
Act of 2006 included provisions modifying the redistri-
bution of unspent funds from previous years to provide 
additional funds in 2007. 17
According to the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) 
estimates, 35 states have projected spending in 2007 
above their allotment for the year, and 11 of those states 
will exhaust their available funds. CBO estimates that 
those states would require $646 million in 2007 to 
maintain their existing programs. Without that funding, 
some states will turn to Medicaid to fund coverage for 
children no longer funded under SCHIP, and, by CBO’s 
estimates, therefore increase Medicaid spending by 
$250 million.
The Effect of SCHIP on Children’s 
Health Insurance Coverage
SCHIP has significantly increased the number of chil-
dren in low-income families who have health insurance, 
but the increase has not been one for one with the num-
ber of children enrolled in public coverage as a result of 
the program. SCHIP provides an alternative source of 
coverage that is less expensive to enrollees and often pro-
vides a broader range of benefits than private coverage; as 
a result, the program “crowds out” private coverage to 
some extent. Estimates of the extent to which private cov-
erage has declined in response to the program vary; the 
available evidence, however, strongly suggests the net 
effect of the program has been to reduce the number of 
uninsured children.
Changes in the Number of Uninsured Children 
Information on changes in the number of children who 
are uninsured comes from self-reported data collected in 
household surveys. This paper used data from the Annual 
Social and Economic Supplements to the Current Popu-
lation Survey, conducted by the Census Bureau, which is 
the most widely cited source of information on insurance 
coverage. Although the survey is intended to measure the 
number of people who were uninsured throughout the 
calendar year, it is widely believed that the survey’s esti-
mates more closely approximate the number of people 
who were uninsured at a particular point in time.18
SCHIP should be expected to have had the greatest effect 
on uninsurance rates among children in families with 
income between 100 percent and 200 percent of the pov-
erty level because that was the group that had the greatest
17. The National Institutes of Health Reform Act of 2006 reduced 
the availability of 2005 allotments in some states from three years 
to two and a half. Specifically, states forfeited half of their unspent 
2005 funds (not exceeding $20 million) if their total available 
funds as of March 31, 2007, were at least twice their projected 
spending in 2007. The law also specified that spending in 2007 
from redistributed funds on adults who are not pregnant will be 
reimbursed at Medicaid’s lower matching rate.
1996 1999 2002 2005
0
5
10
15
20
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30
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100% to 199% of FPL
200% to 299% of FPL
300% of FPL or More
18. For a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the Current 
Population Survey and other household surveys for measuring 
insurance coverage, see Congressional Budget Office, How Many 
People Lack Health Insurance and For How Long? (May 2003); and 
Genevieve Kenney, John Holahan, and Len Nichols, “Toward a 
More Reliable Federal Survey for Tracking Health Insurance Cov-
erage and Access,” Health Services Research, vol. 41, no. 3 (June 
2006), pp. 918–945. 
8 THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM
increase in eligibility for public coverage.19 According to 
CBO’s analysis, the percentage of children in that income 
range who were uninsured fell from 22.5 percent in 1996 
(the year before SCHIP was created) to 16.9 percent in 
2005, a reduction of 5.6 percentage points (see Figure 1). 
The uninsurance rate was relatively stable among chil-
dren in families with income over 200 percent of the pov-
erty level. For example, among children whose families 
had income between 200 percent and 300 percent of the 
poverty level, the uninsurance rate fell from 10.5 percent 
in 1996 to 9.8 percent in 2005.20 
Among children below the poverty level, the uninsurance 
rate rose from 23.8 percent in 1996 to 26.7 percent in 
1998 and then fell to 22.0 percent in 2005. The increase 
from 1996 to 1998 in the percentage of poor children 
who were uninsured was accompanied by a drop in Med-
icaid coverage, which some analysts have cited as an unin-
tended consequence of the welfare reform law that was 
passed in 1996.21 
The decline in the percentage of poor children who were 
uninsured after 1998 was accompanied by an increase in 
Medicaid coverage. SCHIP did not in general make more 
poor children eligible for public coverage, since most 
were already eligible for Medicaid. However, the percent-
age of children eligible for Medicaid who participated in 
that program increased, which some analysts have attrib-
uted partly to states’ outreach efforts for SCHIP (as appli-
cants for SCHIP were enrolled in Medicaid if they were 
found eligible for that program) and the simplified appli-
cation procedures that states adopted for both SCHIP 
and Medicaid.22 
Those changes in the percentage of children who were 
uninsured do not yield an estimate of the impact of 
SCHIP because there are many other factors—such as 
changes in employment levels, family income, and health 
insurance premiums—that affect children’s health insur-
ance coverage. Nevertheless, the fact that the greatest 
reduction in the percentage of children who were unin-
sured occurred among those who had the greatest 
increase in eligibility for public coverage after SCHIP 
was established strongly suggests that the program has 
reduced the number of children in low-income families 
who are uninsured. As discussed below, however, estimat-
ing the effect of SCHIP on children’s health insurance 
coverage requires a more sophisticated analysis that con-
trols for other factors that influence such coverage and 
accounts for the program’s effects on the number of peo-
ple with private insurance.
Children’s Participation in SCHIP
The number of children who participate in SCHIP 
depends in part on low-income parents’ awareness and 
understanding of the program, their attitudes toward 
public insurance programs and health insurance gener-
ally, and the ease of the application process. Nearly all 
states have promoted SCHIP through mass media cam-
paigns, and most have used community-based efforts 
such as educational sessions and home visits.23 States 
have also implemented simpler enrollment procedures for 
SCHIP than what is in place for Medicaid (although 
some have also adopted simpler enrollment procedures 
for Medicaid). For example, most states do not require a 
face-to-face interview to apply for SCHIP or to renew 
coverage but instead use simple mail-in application 
19. One recent study found that children between 100 percent and 
200 percent of the poverty level had a 70 percentage-point 
increase in their rate of eligibility for public coverage from 1996 to 
2002—compared with an increase of about 30 percentage points 
among children between 200 percent and 300 percent of the pov-
erty level, an increase of 10 percentage points among children 
below the poverty level, and an increase of 8 percentage points 
among those between 300 percent and 400 percent of the poverty 
level. See Jonathan Gruber and Kosali Simon, Crowd-Out Ten 
Years Later: Have Recent Public Insurance Expansions Crowded Out 
Private Health Insurance? Working Paper No. 12858 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2007).
20. In its analysis, CBO accounted for the fact that a “confirmation” 
question was added to the Current Population Survey beginning 
with the interviews that collected data for 1999. The new ques-
tion asked people who did not report having any of several types 
of insurance coverage whether, in fact, they were uninsured. CBO 
compared estimates of uninsurance rates with and without the 
data from the confirmation question and used those two sets of 
estimates to create an adjustment factor (separately for each 
income group) that it applied to the estimates for years prior to 
1999 to make them comparable with estimates for later years. 
21. See, for example, Karl Kronebusch, “Medicaid for Children: Fed-
eral Mandates, Welfare Reform, and Policy Backsliding,” Health 
Affairs, vol. 20, no. 1 (January/February 2001), pp. 97–111.
22. See Thomas M. Selden, Julie L. Hudson, and Jessica S. Banthin, 
“Tracking Changes in Eligibility and Coverage Among Children, 
1996–2002,” Health Affairs, vol. 23, no. 5 (September/October 
2004), pp. 39–50.
23. Rosenbach and others, Implementation of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program. 
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forms, and most do not impose an asset test. Most states 
have a 12-month renewal period, which enables children 
to remain enrolled in SCHIP for a year unless their fam-
ily reports a change in income or other circumstances.24 
Since 2001, though, some states have reduced their out-
reach efforts and retracted certain simplified enrollment 
procedures in response to fiscal pressures.25 
According to one study, 29 percent of the children who 
appeared to be eligible for SCHIP in 2005 on the basis of 
their family’s income participated in the program.26 Half 
of the children who were eligible for SCHIP had 
employer-sponsored insurance, 6 percent had other cov-
erage, and 15 percent were uninsured. By that study’s 
estimates, the uninsured children who were eligible for 
SCHIP accounted for over a fifth of all uninsured chil-
dren in 2005. Other studies have estimated that between 
60 percent and 75 percent of all uninsured children are 
eligible for either Medicaid or SCHIP.27 The wide range 
of estimates obtained in those studies is due to differences 
in the data sources and methods used.
Although all of those studies were based on rigorous sta-
tistical methods, they have important limitations because 
they relied on data collected in household surveys to 
determine children’s health insurance coverage and to 
identify children who were eligible for SCHIP or Medic-
aid. Coverage in public programs such as Medicaid is 
underreported in such surveys, but the implications of 
that underreporting for the estimated number of people 
who are uninsured is unclear. There is some evidence that 
many people who are enrolled in Medicaid but who do 
not report having coverage under the program may report 
having private coverage instead.28 There is also evidence 
that some SCHIP enrollees report having private non-
group insurance, which is not surprising given that many 
states design their programs to resemble private insur-
ance.29 Additional research is needed to fully understand 
the implications of the underreporting. 
Another potential problem is that survey data on such 
things as types of income and expenses that may be disre-
garded for determining eligibility are also subject to mis-
reporting. In addition, some major surveys (such as the 
Current Population Survey) collect data on annual 
income, and no information on fluctuations during the 
year, which would be relevant for determining eligibility 
for SCHIP.
The Effect of SCHIP on Private Coverage
Determining the extent to which enrollment in SCHIP is 
offset by reductions in private coverage is important for 
evaluating the overall effects of the program and for 
assessing the extent to which government spending on 
the program has reduced the number of children who are 
uninsured. The crowd-out of private coverage can occur 
through various mechanisms. For example, some parents 
who would have otherwise had family coverage through 
their employer might decline it for their children—or 
might decline coverage altogether—if their children are 
eligible for SCHIP. In addition, previously unemployed 
parents might be more likely to decline coverage at a new 
job if their children are enrolled in SCHIP. To the extent 
that SCHIP makes private coverage less important for 
some families, the program might also increase the likeli-
hood that low-income parents take jobs that offer higher 
cash wages rather than health insurance. Thus, even in 
the majority of states where SCHIP covers only children, 
the program could reduce private coverage among adults 
as well as children.
SCHIP can also reduce private coverage by influencing 
the actions of employers. If employers of low-wage work-
24. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Resuming the 
Path to Health Coverage for Children and Parents: A 50 State Update 
on Eligibility Rules, Enrollment and Renewal Procedures, and Cost-
Sharing Practices in Medicaid and SCHIP in 2006 (January 9, 
2007), available at www.kff.org/medicaid/7608a.cfm.
25. Ibid.
26. Genevieve Kenney and Allison Cook, Coverage Patterns Among 
SCHIP-Eligible Children and Their Parents (Washington, D.C.: 
Urban Institute, Health Policy Online, no. 15, February 2007). 
27. See Selden, Hudson, and Banthin, “Tracking Changes in Eligibil-
ity”; and Lisa Dubay, John Holahan, and Allison Cook, “The 
Uninsured and the Affordability of Health Insurance Coverage,” 
Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, November 30, 2006.
28. See Kathleen Thiede Call and others, “Uncovering the Missing 
Medicaid Cases and Assessing Their Bias for Estimates of the 
Uninsured,” Inquiry, vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 396– 
408.
29. See Joel C. Cantor and others, “The Adequacy of Household Sur-
vey Data for Evaluating the Nongroup Health Insurance Market,” 
Health Services Research (forthcoming); and Anthony T. Lo Sasso 
and Thomas C. Buchmueller, “The Effect of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program on Health Insurance Coverage,” Jour-
nal of Health Economics, vol. 23, no. 5 (2004), pp. 1059–1082.
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ers believe that SCHIP makes health insurance less 
important in attracting high-quality employees, some 
might reduce their contribution to the premiums for 
family coverage, reduce the level of benefits offered, stop 
offering family coverage, or stop offering insurance alto-
gether. Those actions could lead to less private coverage 
among families that are eligible for SCHIP as well as ones 
that are not.
Families that substitute SCHIP for private coverage are 
generally better off as a result of switching to an alterna-
tive source of coverage that is not only lower in cost (to 
the enrollee) but may also have a more extensive package 
of benefits. However, to the extent that employers 
respond to SCHIP by increasing premiums, reducing 
benefits, or declining to offer coverage, other families 
could be worse off. 
Little is known about how employers have responded to 
SCHIP. As discussed below, the limited evidence that is 
available suggests that SCHIP has not affected employers’ 
decisions on whether to offer coverage but may have 
caused them to modestly raise employees’ premiums for 
family coverage relative to the premiums for individual 
coverage. The implication is that most of the reduction in 
private coverage associated with SCHIP’s existence 
appears to result from parents choosing to forgo private 
insurance for their children and instead enroll them in 
SCHIP, presumably because the parents believe the pro-
gram offers better benefits or lower costs than private 
insurance.
As noted previously, the outreach that states have con-
ducted for SCHIP and the simplified application proce-
dures that many have adopted (in some cases, for Medic-
aid as well as for SCHIP) appear to have increased 
enrollment in Medicaid. That increased enrollment in 
Medicaid has probably been offset to some extent by a 
reduction in private coverage, for the same reasons that 
enrollment in SCHIP has probably been partly offset by a 
reduction in private coverage. The reduction in private 
coverage associated with the increase in Medicaid cover-
age is probably smaller than that associated with enroll-
ment in SCHIP, however, because people eligible for 
Medicaid have lower income and less access to private 
insurance than people eligible for SCHIP do.
Measuring the Effect of SCHIP on Private Coverage. Stud-
ies typically define the crowd-out associated with SCHIP 
as the reduction in private coverage due to SCHIP 
expressed as a percentage of the increase in public cover-
age due to the program: 
Crowd-out = -100 * private/ public.30 
Defined that way, the effect can range from zero (if 
SCHIP causes no change in the number of people with 
private coverage) to 100 percent (if the reduction in pri-
vate coverage is equal to the increase in public coverage).
There are several possible variants of the measure, 
depending on how the changes in public and private cov-
erage are defined. Two common measures are these: 
B A broader measure, which captures the total increase 
in public coverage due to SCHIP (including the 
impact on Medicaid) as well as the total reduction in 
private coverage attributable to the program. The 
reduction in private coverage under this measure 
includes all those who would have had private cover-
age if the program did not exist.
B A narrower measure, which captures the substitution 
of SCHIP for private coverage, includes only those 
individuals who are covered by SCHIP under current 
law but who would have had private coverage if the 
program did not exist or, in some studies, had such 
coverage before enrolling in SCHIP.
The broader measure is the most useful for assessing the 
net effect of SCHIP on the insurance coverage of children 
and adults. It accounts for the fact that some people who 
would have otherwise had private coverage might be 
uninsured as a result of families’ or employers’ reactions 
to SCHIP. The narrower measure focuses strictly on peo-
ple enrolled in SCHIP and on the insurance coverage 
they would have had without the program. That measure 
includes people who switched directly from private cover-
age to SCHIP as well as those who were uninsured or 
covered by Medicaid before they enrolled in SCHIP but 
who would have gained private coverage if SCHIP did 
not exist. Both of those measures should include changes 
in private coverage among both children and adults, but 
30. The ratio of the change in private coverage ( private) to the 
change in public coverage ( public) is multiplied by 100 to con-
vert the proportion to a percentage. That value is typically multi-
plied by -1 to express crowd-out as a positive number rather than a 
negative number.
Δ Δ
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the existing studies have estimated only changes among 
children.31 
Efforts to Limit the Substitution of SCHIP for Employer-
Sponsored Insurance. Federal law requires that the states 
have procedures in place to prevent people from substi-
tuting SCHIP for employer-sponsored insurance. The 
Congress included that provision in the authorizing legis-
lation because of concern about substitution, in part 
resulting from a study that estimated that an expansion of 
Medicaid in the late 1980s and early 1990s caused a 
decline in private coverage that was about half the size of 
the increase in Medicaid coverage.32 Subsequent studies 
obtained much lower estimates for the effects of Medic-
aid on private coverage.33 
The potential for SCHIP to displace employer-sponsored 
insurance is greater than it was for the expansion of Med-
icaid because the children eligible for SCHIP are from 
families with higher income and greater access to private 
coverage. According to one study, 60 percent of the chil-
dren who became eligible for SCHIP had private cover-
age in the year before the program was established.34
States have included a variety of features in their pro-
grams to try to prevent SCHIP from displacing 
employer-sponsored insurance. A widely used approach is 
to impose a waiting period—that is, a specified length of 
time that children must be uninsured before becoming 
eligible for SCHIP. In 2006, 35 states had a waiting 
period, the two most common being six months 
(imposed by 16 states) and three months (imposed by 
11).35 Only one state had a waiting period that was 
longer than six months. Many states allow exceptions to 
the waiting period—when a parent loses private coverage 
for reasons considered involuntary (by losing his or her 
job, switching to a job that does not offer family cover-
age, or becoming disabled, for instance) or when the 
available insurance is considered too expensive (if the 
employee’s premiums would exceed a specified percentage 
of income or if the employer contributes less than 50 per-
cent to the cost of coverage, for example).36 Most states 
collect insurance information on the application for 
SCHIP, and some verify that information with employ-
ers. Some states try to limit the displacement of 
employer-sponsored insurance by requiring premiums 
and copayments within SCHIP.
Estimates of the Effects of SCHIP on Private Coverage. 
Estimates vary about the extent to which SCHIP has 
resulted in less private coverage. The available studies, 
which have focused on the effects of SCHIP on children, 
use various data sources and methods. On the basis of a 
review of the available studies, CBO concludes that the 
reduction in private coverage among children is most 
probably between a quarter and a half of the increase in 
public coverage resulting from SCHIP.37 That is, for 
every 100 children who gain coverage as a result of
31. As defined under the narrower measure, SCHIP could influence 
the private coverage of adults only in states that cover adults under 
the program. Under the broader measure, however, the program 
could affect the private coverage of adults in all states through the 
mechanisms described previously. 
32. That estimate includes changes in coverage among children, 
women of childbearing age, and other adults (who were not eligi-
ble for Medicaid). Among children, the study found, the reduc-
tion in private coverage was equal to 40 percent of the increase in 
public coverage. See David M. Cutler and Jonathan Gruber, 
“Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 111, no. 2 (May 1996), 
pp. 391–430.
33. See, for example, Linda J. Blumberg, Lisa Dubay, and Stephen A. 
Norton, “Did the Medicaid Expansions for Children Displace Pri-
vate Insurance? An Analysis Using the SIPP,” Journal of Health 
Economics, vol. 19, no. 1 (2000), pp. 33–60.
34. See Julie L. Hudson, Thomas M. Selden, and Jessica S. Banthin, 
“The Impact of SCHIP on Insurance Coverage of Children,” 
Inquiry, vol. 42, no. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 232–254.
35. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Resuming the 
Path to Health Coverage for Children and Parents.
36. Rosenbach and others, Implementation of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program.
37. That range includes estimates obtained under various approaches. 
Estimates differ under alternative specifications of the statistical 
models that analysts have used; some specifications yield estimates 
that are below or above the range cited. That range encompasses 
the estimates from specifications in the studies that CBO reviewed 
and considered most reliable (listed in the appendix).
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SCHIP, there is a corresponding reduction in private cov-
erage of between 25 and 50 children.38
Measuring the extent to which SCHIP is associated with 
a decline in private coverage is difficult because it requires 
comparing the insurance coverage of people under cur-
rent law with an estimate of the coverage they would have 
had if the program did not exist. Analysts have estimated 
the reduction in private coverage attributable to SCHIP 
by using various statistical models to try to remove the 
effects of other factors that affect private coverage. All 
studies that have been conducted to date have estimated 
the reduction in private coverage among children only; 
they do not capture any possible reduction in private cov-
erage among parents or other adults. Consequently, the 
available estimates probably understate the total extent to 
which SCHIP has reduced private coverage.
The estimates reported in the research literature measure 
average changes in private coverage since SCHIP has 
been implemented, which may differ from what would 
occur if policies were adopted to increase enrollment. For 
example, policies designed to increase enrollment among 
children who are currently eligible would involve less 
reduction in private coverage than would expanding the 
program to cover children in families with higher 
income. Such an expansion to higher income would 
probably involve greater crowd-out of private coverage 
than has occurred to date because such children have 
greater access to private insurance.39
Some studies have estimated crowd-out using the nar-
rower measure defined above by obtaining survey data on 
the insurance coverage of enrollees before they were in 
the program. Such studies classify enrollees who had pri-
vate insurance prior to being in SCHIP as having poten-
tially substituted SCHIP for private coverage, and they 
classify those who were uninsured or covered by Medicaid 
as not having substituted SCHIP for private coverage. 
One such study found that 28 percent of children 
enrolled in SCHIP in 10 states had private coverage at 
some time during the six months before they enrolled in 
the program. 40 Such studies probably understate the full 
extent to which SCHIP reduces private coverage because 
they do not account for the fact that some of the children 
who were uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid prior to 
enrolling in SCHIP may have obtained private coverage if 
SCHIP had not been established.41 Moreover, such stud-
ies do not account for the possibility that some of the 
children who were uninsured prior to enrolling in SCHIP 
may have lost coverage as a result of parents’ or employ-
ers’ response to the program (such as a decision by 
employers to drop family coverage or raise the premi-
ums). In addition, in the surveys that are conducted for 
such studies, some parents might have underreported 
their children’s private coverage before they enrolled in 
SCHIP out of fear that their children could be dropped 
from the program if the state authorities learned that 
their children had private coverage.
There is limited evidence on whether SCHIP has affected 
the health insurance decisions of employers. Only one 
study has examined that issue, and it analyzed employers’
38. Nearly all studies have estimated the effect of SCHIP on private 
coverage generally (including both employer-sponsored insurance 
and private nongroup coverage). Some might argue that studies 
should focus on the effects of the program on employer-sponsored 
insurance, because federal law requires states to have procedures in 
place to prevent the substitution of SCHIP for employer-spon-
sored insurance. However, estimates of the effects of SCHIP are 
not likely to be affected measurably by whether or not private 
nongroup insurance is included. According to CBO’s analysis of 
data from the Current Population Survey, only about 6 percent of 
children with family income between 100 percent and 200 per-
cent of the poverty level had private nongroup insurance in the 
year before SCHIP was enacted, while about half had employer-
sponsored insurance. Moreover, a recent study found that, 
although SCHIP reduced coverage of children by employer-spon-
sored insurance, it had no effect on private nongroup coverage of 
them. See Lisa Dubay and Genevieve Kenney, The Impact of 
SCHIP on Children’s Insurance Coverage: An Analysis Using the 
National Survey of America’s Families (working paper, Washington, 
D.C.: Urban Institute, May 2007). 
39. According to CBO’s analysis of data from the Current Population 
Survey, 50 percent of children in families with income between 
100 percent and 200 percent of the poverty level had private 
coverage in 2005. The rate of private coverage rose to 77 percent 
among children between 200 percent and 300 percent of the 
poverty level, 89 percent among those between 300 percent and 
400 percent of the poverty level, and 95 percent among those over 
400 percent of the poverty level. 
40. See Anna Sommers and others, “Substitution of SCHIP for Pri-
vate Coverage: Results from a 2002 Evaluation in Ten States,” 
Health Affairs, vol. 26, no. 2 (March/April 2007), pp. 529–537.
41. The uninsured population is not a static group but is constantly 
changing. Some people are uninsured for long periods, while oth-
ers are uninsured for shorter periods, such as between jobs. See 
Congressional Budget Office, How Many People Lack Health 
Insurance and For How Long?
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Figure 2.
CBO’s Baseline Projections of 
Funding and Enrollment in SCHIP, 
2007 to 2017 
(Billions of dollars) (Millions of people)
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Fact Sheet for CBO’s March 
2007 Baseline: State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(February 23, 2007). 
responses to SCHIP only through 2001.42 It found no 
evidence that employers stopped offering single or family 
coverage in response to SCHIP but did find evidence sug-
gesting that employers of low-wage workers reacted to the 
program by increasing the marginal cost of family cover-
age (which was defined as the difference between employ-
ees’ premiums for family coverage and single coverage). 
For example, the study estimated, a hypothetical 
employer with 20 percent of its workforce with children 
eligible for public coverage would increase employees’ 
marginal cost of family coverage by about $120 per year 
(in 2001 dollars). The estimated increase was larger in 
states that experienced a higher-than-average increase in 
eligibility for public coverage following the establishment 
of SCHIP and larger for employers with a higher percent-
age of the workforce with children eligible for public 
coverage.
The study also examined the extent to which employees 
accepted private insurance that was offered. It found evi-
dence suggesting that SCHIP reduced the percentage of 
employees who accepted any private coverage, generally, 
and family coverage, specifically. For example, at a hypo-
thetical employer at which 20 percent of the workforce 
had children eligible for public coverage, the estimated 
percentage of employees who accepted any offer of insur-
ance fell by an average of 1 percentage point. Among 
employees who accepted any coverage, a similar decline 
occurred in the percentage of workers who accepted fam-
ily coverage. The estimated declines were greater at 
employers that had a higher percentage of workers with 
children eligible for public coverage. Such findings sug-
gest that SCHIP can reduce private coverage of adults 
as well as children; in other words, the study suggests that 
some workers responded to SCHIP by declining coverage 
altogether, not merely declining coverage for their 
children. 
Issues in Reauthorizing SCHIP
SCHIP, which is authorized to continue through the end 
of 2007, faces significant funding issues that are expected 
to shape its reauthorization. Reauthorization is occurring 
at a time of substantial budgetary pressures as lawmakers 
contend with growing federal spending on health care 
and competing priorities. An additional challenge is 
posed by the reintroduction of “pay-as-you-go” financing 
rules, which require offsets for any increases in manda-
tory federal spending.
Funding levels for SCHIP have not been a concern until 
recently, when some states exhausted their available 
funds. In 2007, CBO estimates, 11 states will require a 
total of $646 million in additional funds to maintain 
their existing programs. If annual funding for the pro-
gram continued at $5 billion (the level incorporated in 
CBO’s baseline spending projections) and current eligi-
bility rules and benefits were unchanged, by 2017, 43 
states would have projected spending outstrip available 
funds by $8.9 billion. With that level of funding, enroll-
ment would fall from 7.4 million in 2007 to 3.5 million 
in 2017, CBO estimates (see Figure 2). 
A key issue to be addressed in reauthorizing SCHIP is 
whether the program will continue to operate as a capped 
grant program with predetermined spending limits or 
whether federal funding will be open-ended. If SCHIP 
continues to operate as a capped grant program, a basic 
question is how funding levels will be adjusted to account 
for growth in enrollment and health care costs and for 
possible changes in the design of the program, including 
eligibility rules and benefit packages.
42. Thomas Buchmueller and others, “The Effect of SCHIP Expan-
sions on Health Insurance Decisions by Employers,” Inquiry, vol. 
42, no. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 218–231. 
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Figure 3.
CBO’s Projections of Funding and 
Enrollment to Maintain States’ Current 
Programs Under SCHIP, 2007 to 2017
(Billions of dollars) (Millions of people)
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Fact Sheet for CBO’s March 
2007 Baseline: State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(February 23, 2007). 
Notes: Following statutory guidelines, CBO’s baseline spending pro-
jections for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) assume that annual funding after 2007 continues at 
the current level of $5 billion. CBO’s estimates were 
obtained by taking states’ projections of spending for 2007 
and 2008, adjusting them in later years to account for 
increases in both health spending per enrollee and the pro-
jected number of enrollees (due to both population growth 
and increases in the number of people who are uninsured). 
The calculations assume no change in eligibility rules or ben-
efit packages after 2008.
Current funding rules for SCHIP do not allow specifically tar-
geting funds to states whose spending exceeds available 
funding. Without such targeting, a greater increase in fund-
ing than the one projected in the figure would be needed. 
The net federal cost of maintaining states’ current programs 
under SCHIP incorporates savings that would arise in the 
Medicaid program, as additional SCHIP funding would 
reduce the states’ need for Medicaid funds.
a. Includes the $5 billion funding level used in CBO’s baseline 
spending projections. 
The Cost of Maintaining the States’ 
Current Programs
By CBO’s estimates, maintaining the states’ current pro-
grams under SCHIP would require funding of $39 bil-
lion for the 2007–2012 period and $98 billion over the 
2007–2017 period—increases of $14 billion and $48 bil-
lion, respectively, over the baseline spending levels. Those 
estimates account for projected increases in health spend-
ing per enrollee and the number of enrollees but assume 
no changes in the design and operation of the states’ 
programs—for example, no changes in eligibility rules, 
benefit packages, or outreach activities. The availability of 
additional federal funds for SCHIP would reduce the 
states’ need for some Medicaid funds, so the net cost to 
the federal government would be smaller. On balance, 
CBO estimates, the net additional federal cost to main-
tain current programs under SCHIP would be $8 billion 
over the 2007–2012 period and $28 billion over the 
2007–2017 period, relative to baseline spending levels. 
With those additional funds, enrollment (at any time 
during the year) would grow from the 8.1 million people 
in 2007 to 8.8 million in 2012 and 9.4 million in 2017 
(see Figure 3).
Those estimates assume that the additional funds could 
be targeted to states whose projected spending exceeded 
their available funds—though current rules for the pro-
gram do not allow such targeting. Without effective tar-
geting, however, a greater increase in funding would be 
needed to maintain states’ current programs.
Options for Modifying SCHIP
Reauthorization presents the Congress with an opportu-
nity to consider changes in SCHIP, including encourag-
ing or requiring efforts by the states to enroll eligible chil-
dren who are uninsured, redefining the target population, 
changing the formula that allocates funds to individual 
states, modifying the rules for the redistribution of 
unspent funds, reexamining the matching rate for the 
program, and modifying the benefits that states are 
required to provide.
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Intensify Efforts to Enroll Eligible Children Who Are 
Uninsured. According to one study, there were about 
2 million children who were eligible for SCHIP but 
uninsured in 2005, accounting for 20 percent of all unin-
sured children in that year.43 One option for policymak-
ers is to maintain the current program but encourage or 
require states to undertake activities to enroll such chil-
dren. For example, the federal government could require 
or provide incentives for states to conduct greater out-
reach and simplify their enrollment procedures, prohibit 
states from using waiting lists to limit enrollment, and 
require that all states grant 12 months of continuous eli-
gibility. Such efforts could not be perfectly targeted to 
children who would have otherwise been uninsured, 
however, so they would reduce private coverage to some 
extent. The amount of any such reduction would depend 
on the nature of the policy and how it was implemented. 
Moreover, greater outreach for SCHIP would lead to 
greater enrollment in Medicaid as well.
The federal government would be limited in its ability to 
evaluate states’ performance at enrolling children who 
would have otherwise been uninsured because timely 
state-level data are not available for most states. The Cur-
rent Population Survey is the only source of state-level 
data on insurance coverage, but sample sizes for most 
states are too small to yield reliable estimates for a single 
year.44 Moreover, sophisticated statistical analysis would 
be required to distinguish changes in uninsurance rates 
that result from efforts to enroll uninsured children in 
SCHIP from changes that result from other factors, such 
as changes in employment levels and family income. 
Consequently, if the federal government provided finan-
cial incentives to the states to undertake activities to 
enroll eligible but uninsured children, those incentives 
would most likely need to take the form of giving the 
states additional funds for conducting certain activities 
(such as outreach) rather than bonuses for meeting cer-
tain performance targets.
Redefine SCHIP’s Target Population. One approach to 
changing the target population for SCHIP is to modify 
the income thresholds that states use to determine eligi-
bility. For example, the target population could be 
expanded by requiring states to increase their thresholds 
to 300 percent of the poverty level.45 Alternatively, the 
thresholds could be reduced—or the matching rate could 
be reduced for children and adults above a certain thresh-
old, such as 200 percent of the poverty level—to focus 
federal funds on children in low-income families. The lat-
ter approach would disproportionately affect states that 
had already expanded Medicaid before the establishment 
of SCHIP and had used SCHIP funds to expand eligibil-
ity to children in families with higher income and to 
adults. Policymakers considering changes to the require-
ments for thresholds may want to take into account the 
fact that states vary in how they define income for deter-
mining eligibility. Many states subtract certain expenses 
or a portion of the family’s income to obtain a measure of 
net income.
Another approach to modifying SCHIP’s target popula-
tion is to change the rules regarding parents. For example, 
making parents eligible would not only extend coverage 
to them but would probably boost participation among 
children currently eligible but not enrolled—as parents 
and their children could be covered under the same insur-
ance.46 Disadvantages of this approach are that it would 
would probably result in greater crowd-out of private 
coverage and would draw funds that could be used to 
cover children.
Other possibilities for changing SCHIP’s target popula-
tion are to expand eligibility to pregnant women, legal 
immigrants, and children of state employees. Coverage 
could also be extended to people with private insur-
ance—for example, by dropping the requirement that 
people be uninsured in order to qualify for SCHIP, which 
would permit people to directly switch from employer-
sponsored insurance to SCHIP. Such a policy might also 
allow the greater use of SCHIP funds in premium assis-
tance programs.
43. Kenney and Cook, Coverage Patterns Among SCHIP-Eligible Chil-
dren and Their Parents.
44. As mentioned previously, the formula that allocates federal funds 
to individual states uses an estimate of the average number of 
uninsured children in each state computed over a three-year 
period.
45. Current rules allow states to effectively expand coverage to fami-
lies with income above 200 percent of the poverty level by disre-
garding certain expenses or a portion of their income. Therefore, 
merely permitting states to increase their thresholds (as opposed to 
requiring them to do so) could have little effect. 
46. Lisa Dubay and Genevieve Kenney, “Expanding Public Health 
Insurance to Parents: Effects on Children’s Coverage Under Med-
icaid,” Health Services Research, vol. 38, no. 5 (October 2003), 
pp. 1283–1302.
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Change the Formula that Allocates Funding to Individual 
States. Each year, federal funding for SCHIP is allocated 
to states on the basis of a formula that takes into account 
the number of children in low-income families (with 
income less than 200 percent of the poverty level) in each 
state, the number of such children who are uninsured, 
and wages in the health services sector. An important and 
unintended limitation of the formula is that it reduces 
allotments for states that enroll more children in SCHIP. 
One possible solution is to include the number of chil-
dren enrolled in SCHIP in the formula. For example, the 
formula could be modified to allocate funds to states on 
the basis of the sum of the number of children who are 
enrolled in SCHIP and the number of children who are 
in low-income families and who are uninsured.47 The 
number of children enrolled in SCHIP would be deter-
mined from administrative data, while the number of 
children who are in low-income families and who are 
uninsured would continue to be estimated from survey 
data.48 A potential problem with including SCHIP’s 
enrollment in the allocation formula is that it could 
reward states that had higher levels of substitution of 
SCHIP for private coverage.
Another possible approach is to allocate funds to states on 
the basis of their historical spending on SCHIP. For 
example, each state’s share of the national funding for a 
particular year could be determined from its share of fed-
eral spending for SCHIP in a specified base year (or per-
haps its share of funding averaged over several base years). 
Alternatively, state-specific allotments could be deter-
mined by a statutory formula that would adjust each 
state’s spending from a specified base year to account for 
factors such as projected growth in costs per enrollee and 
population growth. Although using historical data on 
spending would be intended to align states’ future allot-
ments more closely with their funding requirements, such 
an approach would make it more difficult for states that 
have operated limited programs in the past to expand 
their programs. In addition, if the base year for determin-
ing funding allocations was updated periodically, this 
approach could reduce states’ incentive to spend money 
efficiently, because greater spending in the base year 
could increase states’ share of federal funds in the future. 
Finally, some of the floors and the ceilings that are used to 
calculate a state’s share of federal SCHIP funding utilize 
1999 as the base year—raising some issues because, at 
that time, some states’ programs had been in place for 
only a short period. Therefore, an option would be to use 
a more recent year as the base year for calculating floors 
and ceilings so that all programs will have been opera-
tional for longer periods of time. In addition, more recent 
state shares are based on expanded Current Population 
Surveys, yielding more precise estimates.
Modify the Rules for the Redistribution of Unspent 
Funds. In altering SCHIP, another option is to shorten 
the length of time that states have to spend their allot-
ments (as the National Institutes of Health Reform Act of 
2006 did for allotments that were unspent in 2005). 
Shortening the length of time that states can spend their 
allotments would increase the amount of funds available 
for redistribution and more effectively target funds to 
states with higher spending.
Reexamine the Matching Rate. The enhanced matching 
rate was originally put in place to encourage states’ partic-
ipation in SCHIP. At the time, the incentive was per-
ceived as necessary because only a few states had taken 
advantage of the existing flexibility to expand their Med-
icaid programs. Reducing the matching rate for SCHIP 
would increase the states’ share of spending for the pro-
gram and could cause some states to reduce the size of 
their program. But having a uniform matching rate—
for both SCHIP and Medicaid—may be more equitable, 
especially for states that expanded their Medicaid pro-
grams before the establishment of SCHIP and are reim-
bursed at the lower Medicaid rate for children who would 
otherwise qualify for the higher SCHIP rate. In addition, 
a uniform matching rate would overcome the criticism 
that the current enhanced matching formula for SCHIP 
disproportionately favors states with the lowest Medicaid
47. Under that approach, the total number of low-income children in 
the state would no longer appear in the formula. See Czajka and 
Jabine, “Using Survey Data to Allocate Federal Funds for the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP),” pp. 409–427.
48. States could be required to include in the administrative data sub-
mitted to the federal government information on family income 
and family size that could be used to compute the number of chil-
dren enrolled in SCHIP whose family income was less than 200 
percent of the poverty level, which would make that measure 
more comparable with the measures used in the current allocation 
formula. 
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matching rates.49 Still, the federal government could 
make use of an enhanced matching rate as a financial 
incentive in order to elicit certain behavior from states.
Augment Required Benefits. States that expanded Medic-
aid are required to provide a wide range of services under 
Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and 
Treatment (EPSDT) program. That program includes 
various screening services and mandates treatment for 
diagnosed conditions. States with a separate program 
under SCHIP must cover some basic benefits. Some of 
them have included optional benefits, but the generosity 
of those benefits varies. One option, then, to even out the 
benefits provided under SCHIP, and perhaps attract more 
enrollees, would be to require states to provide the ser-
vices in the EPSDT program. Alternatively, requirements 
could target specific benefits, such as dental services.
49. A state with the lowest Medicaid matching rate of 50 percent 
receives SCHIP’s enhanced matching rate of 65 percent (a gain of 
15 percentage points), whereas a state with a Medicaid matching 
rate of 76 percent receives an enhanced matching rate of 83 per-
cent (a gain of 7 percentage points).
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